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The Greek Interwar Refugee Crisis as a 
cause of the Greek Civil War, 1922-
1949 
Michael B. O'Sullivan 
In his explanation for the causes of the outbreak of 
the Peloponnesian War, the first civil war between 
Greeks, Thucydides drew a distinction between "imme-
diate" and "real" causes. This causation model is also 
useful in understanding the origins of another civil war 
between Greeks. The "immediate" cause of the 1944-
1949 Greek civil war was the power vacuum resulting 
from the withdrawal of the German Army and the 
subsequent scramble for control of the state by the 
rival political factions ofthe Greek Right and Left. This 
is only part of the story. Identifying the "real," underly-
ing causes of the Greek civil war is a task that histori-
ans have failed to pinpoint. Traditional narratives have 
seen the war as the first conflict of the Cold War and 
consequently have focused primarily on foreign inter-
ventions and the events in Athens from December 
1944, while neglecting the communal conflicts in the 
provinces. Within these narratives, class and ethnic 
divisions are regarded as "relatively unimportant. '" 
I See David Close, ed., The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950: 
Studies of polarization. (London: Routledge, 1993).; David H. 
Close, The Origins of the Greek Civil War. Origins of Modern 
Wars Series, (New York: Longman Publishing, 1995).; Edgar 
O'Ballance. The Greek Civil War 1944-1949. (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966). In traditional accounts 
of the Greek civil war, As Mark Mazower points Qut, "Athens, 
London, and Washington [have] provided the focus, not villages, 
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The Greek civil war was not, as has been previously 
assumed, merely a bipolar struggle between two 
political groups. Instead, it was a conflict between a 
multitude of communities, down to tbe neighborhood 
and village level, entangled in a web of antagonistic 
ethnic and class cleavages. Witbin this imbroglio, 
differences of etbnic and class identity among Greeks, 
not competing political allegiances, were tbe most 
crucial factors in provoking tbe outbreak of sustained 
violence between communities during tbe Axis occupa-
tion. Communal warfare then facilitated tbe onset of a 
general civil war. The atomization of Greece into a 
series of divided communities, overwhelmed by out-
breaks of open violence were in fact a manifestation of 
two decades of persistent political, social, etbnic and 
class divisions in Greece. The catalyst for these divi-
sions was the refugee settlement crisis that followed 
Greece's disastrous defeat in tbe Greco-Turkish war of 
1919-1922. The repercussions of tbese crises are 
responsible for what can be termed the "real" causes, 
as Thucydides would have understood tbem, of the 
Greek civil war. 
valleys, or the provinces." The causes of the conflict have been 
almost entirely attributed to a division between political groups 
on the Right and Left. According to David Close, the 
circumstances of primary importance were "competition for 
control of the state by two sets of political leaders, each with 
military allies, and each drawing support from a variety of 
regions and from a wide range of occupational groups. n Ethnic 
and class divisions remain largely unexplored as a catalyst for 
the outbreak of the war. This is curious since many historians 
acknowledge the ethnic problems associated with the refugee 
settlement and the occupation but give them inadequate 
attention within the explanation for the causes of the civil war. 
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In 1919 the Greek army established a foothold in 
far western Anatolia in the hopes of fulfilling the 'Great 
Idea,' the driving force of Greek nationalism for the 
past century, calling for the union of the Hellenic and 
Anatolian Greek lands and peoples into a Greater 
Greece? In July 1921, the Greek army struck east-
ward and northward with the goal of capturffig Angora, 
the seat of the new Turkish government. 3 In full-scale 
retreat after the Turkish counter-attack in August and 
September, the Greek army made no distinction 
between Turkish and Greek communities, burning 
down villages and massacring the inhabitants. Left 
homeless by the ftres set by the Greek army and 
fearing Turkish retaliation, Greek refugees frantically 
made their way to the ports of the Aegean, chiefly 
Smyrna.' 
Greek refugees were rounded up and forcibly 
deported by the Turks from a number of regions 
throughout Asia Minor, enduring constant attack on 
their way to being deported from the port cities of 
Greece.5 These initial expulsions in the wake of the 
Greek retreat were however only a fraction of the story. 
In November 1922, Turkish and Greek representatives 
met at Lausanne to discuss terms and to solve the 
Greek refugee issue. By July 1923 the Treaty had been 
signed, resulting in the mandatory transfer of 1.3 
million Greeks who lived in Anatolia to Greece and 
2 Norman Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in 
Twentieth-Century Europe, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 20011, 44-5. 
3 Ibid., 45. 
4 Ibid., 46. 
, Ibid., 53. 
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356,000 Turks, the majority of whom lived in Aegean 
Macedonia, to Turkey. 
The difficulties associated with the settlement of 
the refugees in the 1920s fueled a mutual animosity 
between the refugee and native populations of the 
country. These antagonisms were compounded pri-
marily by four factors : the failure of the Refugee 
Settlement Commission to successfully settle the 
refugees, ethnic and cultural differences between the 
two groups, conflicting political allegiances, and 
economic competition. All of these factors reinforced 
the refugees' sense of separation from their native 
Greek neighbors.6 
Settling 1.3 million refugees in an already overpop-
ulated country of 5.4 million people was a monumental 
task. In response, the Treaty of Lausanne mandated 
the creation of Mixed Commissions run by the League 
of Nations whose task was to oversee the settlement of 
refugees in each country.7 In Greece the Refugee 
Settlement Commission (RSC) was set up to assist the 
Greek government in settling the refugees. Tradition-
ally, the RSC has been seen as extremely successful, 
helping to increase the economic productivity of the 
country and acting as a stabilizing influence in the 
6 Renee Hirschon, Heirs althe Greek catastmphe : the social 
life of Asia Minor refugees in Piraeus. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 19891, 13 
7 Renee Hirschon, ed. Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of 
the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and 
Turkey. Studies in Forced Migration, Vol. 12. (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 20031, 7-8. The RSC was made up of four 
members - two appointed by the Greek government, one by the 
League of Nations, and the fourth, the chairman, an American 
citizen named Charles B. Eddy. See also Hirschon, Heirs. "J 39 . 
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country at large by preventing tbe potential radicaliza-
tion of the refugees." 
Upon tbe dissolution of tbe RSC in 1930, its 
chairman, Charles B. Eddy, published a book detailing 
the work of the commission over the previous eight 
years. Since most literature on tbe Greek civil war 
devotes only a few comments to the refugee ~ettlement 
and tbe RSC, historians have neglected to raise objec-
tion to Eddy's conclusions. The inability of historians 
to adequately examine tbis report has profoundly 
influenced tbe histories of interwar Greece. By neglect-
ing to scrutinize the RSC reports, historians have 
underestimated how the dramatic land reforms carried 
out by tbe commission undermined social stability in 
the villages of Greece by fostering tensions between 
native Greeks and tbe refugees. Eddy's interpretation 
of tbe RSC's successes is at best premature and at 
worst a deliberate turning of a blind eye to the realities 
of the refugee's plight.9 Throughout, Eddy's tone is 
, See Charles B. Eddy, Greece and the Greek Refugees, 
(London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd 19311.; Georgios Kritikos, 
"The Agricultural Settlement of Refugees: A Source of Productive 
Work and Stability in Greece, 1923-1930", Agricultural History 
79, no. 3., Agricultural History Society, (Summer, 20051: 321-
346. 
, See Greek Refugee Settlement Commission. Settlement of 
Greek refugees: General summary of the work of the Greek 
Refugee Settlement Commission. Geneva: League of Nations, 
1928; League of Nations. Assembly, Second Committee. Report 
on the work of the Greek Refugees Settlement Commiss ion / 
presen ted to the Assembly by the Second committee. 
Rapporteur: M. van Cauwelaert (Belgiuml . Geneva: League of 
Nations, 1926.; Greek Refugee Settlement Commission. Greece : 
report on the liquidation a/the Refugee Settlement Commission. 
Geneva: League of Nations, 1931.; Greece. Convention between 
the Hellenic government and the Refugee Settlement Commission, 
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self-congratulatory, lauding the success of the com-
mission in assimilating the refugees into Greek society 
and providing them with housing and opportunities for 
economic advancement. 
While the RSC did bring some solutions to a 
seemingly impossible humanitarian crisis, the commis-
sion's policies governing the agricultural and urban 
settlement of refugees in Greece created new crises 
and incited intense animosity among native Greeks 
toward both the refugees and the incumbent Greek 
government. 
The focus of the RSC was agricultural, with Mace-
donia as the main area of settlement, the rationale 
being that the homes of forcibly deported Muslims 
would be turned over to the refugees .'o Large estates 
were carved up among refugees, as were large swathes 
of uncultivated land that had been formerly owned by 
Turkish landownersY However, the redistribution of 
Turkish and Bulgarian lands posed an unexpected 
problem. In the delay between the evacuation of the 
Turkish landowners and the settlement of the refu-
gees, local Greeks and non-Greeks had settled or 
purchased the unclaimed land. 
Preferring to deprive private owners of their land 
rather than sacrifice state lands, officials of the RSC 
expelled the native population from these areas in 
order to free them up for use by the refugees. This 
signed at Geneva on January 24th, 1930. Geneva; League of 
Nations, 1930.; Greek Refugee Settlement Commission. Greece: 
quarterly report of the Refugee Settlement Commission. Geneva: 
League of Nations, 1924-30 
10 Kritikos, 324. 
II Ibid. , 328. 
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triggered a number of massacres in northern Greece. l2 
These conflicts led to the division of villages into 
distinct quarters based on ethnic identity, where the 
natives remained in the old part of the village while the 
refugees occupied enclaves away from the village 
center. 13 
Only in 1924 did the RSC begin to undertake the 
settlement of the 500,000 refugees living ill urban 
areas. For years after returning to Greece, refugees 
lived in camps on the outskirts of Athens, Piraeus and 
Salonika where disease was rife and food and medicine 
extremely scarce. One report stated that forty to fifty 
Greeks died every day in the camps throughout from 
1922-1924, hundreds more dying in rudimentary 
hospitals. 14 These circumstances were glossed over in 
the often self-indulgent RSC reports. 
In cities like Salonika, urban space was drastically 
transformed in order to accommodate the refugees. 
The settlement of the refugees in specific districts was 
based on a logic of class stratification. 15 The removal of 
the city's 25,000 Muslims dter 1923 cleared space for 
the settlement of the more affluent refugees from 
12 Ibid., 330. Both locals and refugees were massacred in the 
district of Serres as the two s ides struggled to set the boundaries 
of their lands. At Plevna, refugees and locals fought in the fields. 
In Nigrita, locals burned down makeshift refugee huts and at 
Koupji a number of killings occurred. 
13 Elisabeth Kontogiorgi, Population Exchange in Greek 
Macedonia: The Forced Settlement of Refugees 1922-1 930, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 259. 
J<I Naimark, Fires of Hatred, 55. 
15 Vilma Hastaoglou-Martinidis, "A Mediterranean City in 
Transition: Thessaloniki Between the Two World Wars." Facta 
Universitatis. Architecture and Civil Engineering 1, no. 4. (19971. 
502. 
7
O'Sullivan: The Greek Interwar Refugee Crisis
Published by Scholar Commons, 2010
The Greek Interwar Refugee Crisis 51 
Anatolia in undamaged areas of the city. On the other 
hand, poor refugees were settled in eighteen refugee 
housing districts on the city's outskirts, consisting of 
little more than shanty towns with squatter houses. 16 
The organization of urban space based on affluence 
greatly accelerated class divisions within cities like 
Salonika. The stigma of ethnic difference endured by 
the refugees was exacerbated by their spatial segrega-
tion on the city's outskirts. Class now came to com-
pound already existing divisions based on ethnic and 
political differences within the refugee community. As 
upper class refugees became involved in politics they 
began to distance themselves from the poor masses of 
refugees. For the first time, "stratification and class 
distinctions began to prevail over place of origin or 
ethnic affiliation for a section of the Asia Minor popula-
tion."·7 This would have significant repercussions 
during the Second World War and the Greek civil war. 
A common view, among both historians and observ-
ers living at the time, maintains that the ultimate 
result of the popUlation exchanges after the Greco-
Turkish war was to turn Greece into a more homoge-
nous society.18 In fact, the Asia Minor refugees were 
yet another stream of refugees inundating Greece from 
1912 to 1922.19 Each group was extremely diverse in 
terms of language, wealth, and customs. What propo-
nents of the 'Great Idea' had failed to take into account 
was that the Greek communities of Asia Minor, far 
removed from the Greek mainland and having lived 
16 Ibid. 
17 Hirschon , Heirs ... ; 45. 
18 Kontogiorgi, 19. 
19 They were preceded by groups of Greek refugees from 
Thrace, Bulgaria, the Black Sea littoral, and the Caucasus. 
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under Ottoman rule for more than five centuries, 
possessed a linguistic, cultural, and ideological heri-
tage markedly different from the Greeks of the main-
land. 
As subjects in the Ottoman Empire, Anatolian 
Greeks saw their connections with the Orthodox 
Church in Constantinople as providing the basis for 
their "enduring sense of separate identity." Despite 
being a subject people, the religious identity of Anato-
lian Greeks during the centuries of Ottoman rule 
produced no sense of inferiority, but rather one of 
superiority to other groups under Ottoman rule!O The 
Anatolian refugees kept this sense of cultural superior-
ity and a separate identity when they came to Greece. 
Their opinior,s oflocal Greeks were pejorative; perceiv-
ing "locals as narrow-minded, ignorant, and uncouth, 
a view which became entrenched as time passed and 
disillusionment grew."2l For their part, the locals 
leveled insults at the refugees like "Turkish-seed," 
"yoghurt-baptized," and "orientals."22 Most Anatolian 
Greeks did not consider themselves Greeks at all, 
seeing themselves instead as "Anatolian Christians" or 
"Christians from the East."23 Linguistic differences 
made the divisions between refugees and natives even 
more pronounced. Many refugees only spoke Turkish 
and those few refugees who did speak Greek did so in 
20 Ibid. , 13. 
21 Hirschon, Heirs, 12. Refugees also referred to local Greeks 
as uncultured, rough, and boorish, commonly calling them 
'Vlachs', shepherds or 'country bumpkins.' See Ibid., 33 
22 See Mazower, Salonica, city of ghosts: Christians, Muslims 
and Jews, 1430-1950. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 337; 
Hirschon, Crossing. 19 . 
23 Mazower, Salonica, 336-7. 
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dialects incomprehensible to their native Greek neigh-
bors?' One particular episode vividly illustrates this 
point. As refugees from Anatolia flooded Salonika in 
1923, the city's Muslim population, awaiting their own 
deportation, were shocked to fmd that the refugees 
spoke Turkish and sang in the same scale.25 
Cultural differences then intensified political 
dissension. Ethnic divisions between refugees and 
natives occurred against a backdrop of political insta-
bility in Greece and the refugees worsened the political 
divides initiated by the National Schism (Ethnikos 
Dikhasmos) between monarchists and republicans. 
The refugees pledged their support to the Republican 
Party of Eleftherios Venizelos, the masterly politician 
who, in direct opposition to the monarchy, brought 
Greece into the First World War on the side of the 
Allies and spearheaded the Asia Minor campaign. 
Venizelos instituted massive land reforms throughout 
the country, turning many Greeks, especially rural 
refugees, into smalllandholders?6 
With the support of the refugees and the new 
territories recently incorporated into the Greek state 
after the Balkan and First World Wars, the Venizelists 
were able to dominate the polls throughout the 
1920s.27 To the refugees, Venizelos was 'Leader of the 
24 Naimark, Fires of Hatred, 55. 
25 Mazower, Saionica, 337. 
26 Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler's Greece: the experience of 
occupation, 1941-1944, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 12. 
27 Thanos Veremis, "1922: Political Continuations of the 
Exchange of Populations for Turkey," in Crossing the Aegean: An 
Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between 
Greece and Turkey, ed. Renee (sic) Hirschon, Studies in Forced 
10
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Nation,' 'the One,' 'Our Father. >28 On the other hand, 
the political opponents of Venizelos, the anti-
Venizelists, regarded him as "nothing less than the 
embodiment of Satan himself."29 Stoutly monarchist 
and anti-refugee, the anti-Venizelists drew their 
support from the Peloponnese and Attica, the heart of 
the nineteenth century Greek state, and areas where 
few refugees settled. The regions where refugees were 
settled were more divided between Venizelist and anti-
Venizelist supporters, the basis of support often being 
ethnic identity. Although the refugees constituted 
around one-quarter of the country's population, they 
remained drastically under-represented in national 
politics. 30 Despite their under-representation, the 
refugees completely transformed the political land-
scape of Greece in the interwar period, principally 
because they were responsible for defeating the old 
political parties of Greece and infusing Greece with 
new social perceptions.31 
The Venizelists began to lose popularity among 
refugees after the Treaty of Ankara in 1930. Here 
Venizelos and the Turkish representatives concluded 
that the refugees from Anatolia would not receive 
compensation for their properties left behind in Asia 
Minor. 32 Venizelos soon thereafter fell out offavorwith 
many refugees and they began to look for political 
Migration, Vol. 12. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 57. 
28 Mazower, HitZer's Greece, 12 . 
29 Ibid., 12. 
30 Hirschon, Heirs, 44. 
31Dmitri Pentzopolous, The Balkan exchange afminorities 
and its impact on Greece, (London: Hurt and Company, 2002), 
168; Veremis in Hirschon, Crossing. 55. 
32 Hirschon, Heirs, 47 . 
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patrons elsewhere, which allowed anti-Venizelist 
factions to secure the significant refugee vote. Coaxing 
the refugees in with the promise of compensation 
denied to them by the Treaty of Ankara, the anti-
Venizelists immediately upon taking power reneged on 
the promise and once again undertook an anti-refugee 
program. 
It was the combined effects of disillusionment with 
the Venizelists, the economic depression of the 1930s, 
and the persecution experienced under the anti-
Venizelists that led a small percentage of refugee 
communities to abandon traditional political patrons 
in favor of more radical ones. 33 The movement among 
refugees away from traditional patrons dissolved the 
threadbare unity of culturally diverse rural refugee 
communities, stimulating the further atomization of 
the country into rival sects. All of this had dramatic 
repercussions during the Axis occupation in the 
Second World War. 
The refugees pledged support to Venizelists be-
cause they "appealed to the sense of alienation of the 
new lands which were under-represented in the state 
machine."34 Among urban refugees, neglected by the 
RSC and living in overcrowded slums in Greece's major 
cities, this sense of alienation prompted them to 
support the burgeoning Greek Communist Party 
(KKE) .35 Founded in 1918, the KKE was never a 
popular party during the interwar period. The most 
votes it obtained in any election was 10%.36 
33 Hirschon, Heirs, 44. 
34 Close, Origins, 13. 
35 Hirschon, Heirs, 29 . 
36 O'Mallagh, 30. 
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Unsurprisingly, Communism held little appeal among 
rural refugee landowners, because the ownership of 
land ensured a certain degree of fmancial security and 
created a petit-bourgeois mentality among rural 
refugees.37 In addition, because the Greek state had 
provided them with their landholdings, refugees saw 
little reason to subvert.the state. 
Chief among the reasons why Communism failed to 
catch on with rural refugees was the KKE's 'Macedo-
nia' agenda. Under orders from the Comintem in 
Moscow, the KKE was obliged to campaign for an 
independent Macedonian state. It was obviously 
unpopular among refugees in northern Greece who 
had recently been settled on landholdings in Macedo-
nia.3• The refugees certainly did not wish to become 
minorities once again, especially after they had gained 
superiority in numbers in their new landholdings. The 
KKE was also directly opposed, like the anti-
Venizelists, to the distribution ofland to the refugees 
at the expense of the natives.39 
With the adoption of an anti-fascist Popular Front 
policy in 1934, the KKE abandoned its 'Macedonia 
program', for one that proclaimed "political equality for 
all minorities."40 Now the Communists began to find 
support among rural refugees, albeit a limited amount. 
Also important to success of Communist propaganda, 
31 Vilma Hastaoglou-Martinidis, "A Mediterranean City ...... 
503. 
38 See Kritikos, "The Agricultural Settlement of Refugees .. . ". 
337-40. 
39 Kontogiorgi, 188-9; George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn 
Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922· 
1936. (Berkeley: University of California Press, Ltd), 1983, 219. 
~o Veremis, 58. 
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was the abandonment of the rhetoric of rigid class 
categories. This allowed the party to address the 
refugees as a whole group, unified on the basis of 
ethnicity and no longer separated by class 
differences.4 1 Although rural refugees still remained a 
small minority within the KKE, the developments in 
1936 indicated the growing importance of ethnicity in 
determining political affIliation. By 1935, half of the 
Central Committee and most of the Politburo members 
were refugees, including Party Secretary, Nikos 
Zachariades!2 
In the elections of 1936, the KKE gained 15 seats in 
Parliament, which was enough to create a 
parliamentary impasse,,3 When the Liberals began 
negotiating a secret deal with the KKE, the Army 
withdrew its support for the government. Fearing a 
coup, the recently restored King appointed General 
John Metaxas premier and gave him the authority to 
rule by decree.44 Soon thereafter, the KKE was 
. suppressed, its leaders were arrested and its ranks 
infIltra ted by the Metaxas security police . The Metaxas 
government's identification of the KKE as an internal 
enemy coincided with the fostering of a national Greek 
identity based on certain ethnic criteria, which helped 
to reinforce the refugees' separateness,,5 The 
" KKE s tatement from 1936 titled "On the Refugee 
Question." Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, 222-3 . 
42 Veremis, 58; Mavrogordatos. 222-4. Zachariades was born 
in Asia Minor in 1903 and came to Greece in 1922. 
<13 Haris Vlavianos, Greece, 1941-49: from resis tance to civil 
war: the strategy of the Greek Communist Party. (New York: St. 
Martin 's Press , 19921, II. 
"" See Vlavianos, Greece, 1 941 -49, 13-4. 
" Ibid . 
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prevalence of urban refugees within the ranks of the 
KKE led to the association of refugees, who were seen 
as culturally and ethnically 'un-Greek', with 
Communism, a foreign political ideology.4. 
The Axis invasion and occupation of Greece 
beginning in April 1941 removed the controls on civil 
society enforced by the Metaxas regime. It also 
transformed the KKE's role in Greek society. The KKE 
took the lead in organizing systematic resistance, 
forming the National Liberation Front (EAM) in 
September 1941. Unable to persuade the bourgeois 
parties to join EAM, the KKE was able to recruit 
several left-wing political groups into EAM, which it 
easily dominated. EAM \\ as principally a political 
organization and the need for a more militaristic 
resistance to the occupation led to the creation of the 
National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) in April 
1942. 
ELAS was the only effective nation-wide resistance 
group. The bourgeois parties failed in their attempt to 
create a resistance movement since they lacked KKE's 
ability to organize a mass mobilization and many 
traditional politicians rejected the need to conduct a 
resistance. The other principal resistance groups 
operated in specific regions only and were primarily 
military organizations, lacking the political program of 
EAM/ELAS.47 Despite the fact that the KKE dominated 
EAM/ELAS, the majority of its members were not 
46 Hirschon demonstrates that the prevalence of Communist 
sympathizers in refugee communities was later used to 
stigmatize them. Even in the 19708 native Greeks continued to 
stigmatize urban refugee localities because of this association. 
See Hirschon, Heirs, 47 . 
47 Vlavianos, 26-7 . 
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Communist and by war's end the membership of 
EAMjELAS included 30% of the Greek population.4s 
Yet, while the pre-war refugee urban districts were 
bastions of support for EAMjELAS, among rural 
refugees support for the organization varied 
dramatically depending upon the region. The realities 
of collaboration and resistance in cities and villages 
throughout Greece during the Axis occupation starkly 
reflected pre-war communal and ethnic cleavages. 
Both the Greek resistance groups and the Axis 
gendarmerie, with the support of Greek collaborators 
like the Security Battalions, exploited pre-existing 
disaffection between refugees, non-Greeks, and 
Greeks. 
Collaboration or resistance was contingent upon a 
mUltiplicity of factors and motives, all of which varied 
depending upon the region. For instance, the Turkish-
speaking Pontians who accepted arms from the 
Germans did so in order to "promote their interests as 
. a community linguistically different from a neighboring 
community. ,,49 In many cases collaboration or 
resistance was based upon whoever was the more 
dominant element in the town. 50 A report written by 
ELAS in 1944 "explained the arming of the refugee or 
mixed villages of the eastern lowlands in terms of pre-
existing communal disaffection and friction."5l 
Mixed villages throughout northern Greece and 
Macedonia were divided between collaborators and 
resisters based upon ethnic differences. In the case of 
48 Ibid., 251, 24. 
49 Kolipulous. 77. 
50 Ibid. 
S! KolipuIous, 77 
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the Macedonian town of Pel argos, the Greek-speaking 
refugee population sided with ELAS while the Turkish-
speaking refugees from the Pontus and the Caucasus 
sided with the Germans. In other mixed villages, Slav 
Macedonians sided with guerilla forces while the 
refugees sided with the occupying forces. 52 In rural 
Euboea, a region made up of Greek natives, Albanian-
speaking Greek Orthodox natives, and Asia Minor 
refugees, it was only the refugees who supported 
EAMjELAS.53 Regions where the KKEhad been unable 
to gain much support before the war were now strong 
supporters of EAMjELAS. In parts of Western 
Macedonia, Turkish-speaking refugees from Asia · 
Minor accepted arms from the Germans in order to 
protect against ELAS attacks.54 However, in that same 
region, EAM jELAS could rely on the support of Greek-
speaking refugees from the Caucasus who were pro-
Russian and supported Communism. To add to the 
confusion, other communities of Greek-speaking 
villagers in western Macedonia fled from EAMjELAS 
abuses. 55 In Thrace, the impact of EAMjELAS was 
virtually non-existent because of the presence of a 
large Muslim minority and Bulgarian garrisons allied 
with the Germans. In Thessaly, supportfor EAMjELAS 
existed only among the radical refugees living in the 
plains."6 
Typically, EAMjELAS found support in those 
regions, which were traditionally Venizelist. On the 
other hand, many collabor?tionist forces like the 
" Kolipulous, 73. 
" Close, Origins, 98. 
S< Ibid., 114. 
55 Ibid., 90. 
" Ibid., 97. 
17
O'Sullivan: The Greek Interwar Refugee Crisis
Published by Scholar Commons, 2010
The Greek Interwar Refugee Crisis 61 
Security Battalions were from the central provinces 
and the Peloponnese, regions where support for 
EAMjELAS was minimal!7 The lack of support in 
these regions can be explained by the fact that very few 
refugees had settled there in the 1920s and they were 
traditionally anti-Venizelist,58 which left no room for 
the development of political and ethnic cleavages 
characteristic of regions where refugees were settled in 
large numbers. 
These inter-communal conflicts were not merely a 
rural phenomenon. However, the source of conflict was 
different in the urban areas. Whereas in the rural 
areas ethnicity determined allegiance, class divisions 
fueled conflict in urban centers. Fighting in the urban 
centers had none of the confusion characteristic of 
rural regions. Essentially it was a bipolar conflict 
between the proletarian-backed EAMjELAS and the 
bourgeois-supported collaborationist forces . 
The refugees who had lived in the shantytowns of 
. Greece's major cities had been radicalized by the KKE's 
propaganda well before the war and their stratification 
within the urban space made them intensely aware of 
the significant socio-economic disparities between 
themselves and the wealthier sections of the city. 
Before the war the refugees had remained politically 
marginalized, excluded by the bourgeois parties and 
the elite from participating in the country's political 
process. EAMjELAS provided the refugees with 
opportunities of mass activism. 59 
57 See Ibid., 97-9, II4-S. 
" Ibid ., 90. 
59 Mazower, Inside Hitler's Greece, 285. 
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Many native Greeks in the urban areas were 
vehemently opposed to EAM / ELAS and collaborated in 
significant numbers with the Axis. Beginning in 1944 
in the major cities of the country - Athens, Piraeus 
and Salonika - heavy street-fighting broke out between 
EAM/ELAS and a number of collaborationist groups. 
In anti-partisan sweeps in the major cities, the 
Security Battalions and the Germans attacked the 
working-class refugee quarters, like Kokkinia in 
Athens, which were strongholds of EAM/ELAS.60 On 
the other hand, the urban middle and upper classes 
were ardent supporters of collaborationist groups like 
the Security Battalions.61 
Inter-communal conflicts reached their zenith in 
1943-4, as EAM/ELAS grew more popular, which 
made other Greek resistance groups, as well as the 
exiled King in Cairo and the bourgeois-backed 
collaborationist battalions, increasingly apprehensive 
about a Communist takeover. In 1943, the other Greek 
resistance groups like EDES signed a ceasefrre with 
the Germans in order to fight EAM/ELAS. As the 
Germans conducted large anti-partisan sweer,s 
throughout the country with the support of 
collaborationist groups, the profusion of inter-
communal conflicts became more magnified. 
They did not end with the Germa:.l evacuation in 
October 1944. The well-known battles that took place 
in Athens between EAM/ELAS and the British-backed 
monarchist forces in December 1944, which have 
60 Ibid., 341-2. 
61 As a Security Battalion marched through wealthy 
neighborhoods in Athens before an attack on a section of the 
refugee quarter held by EAM/ELAS the wealthy citizens 
applauded in support. Ibid., 278.0 
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always been the centerpiece of traditional histories of 
the Greek civil war, were just one aspect of a much 
larger pan-Greek conflict. Since the fighting in Athens 
was a relatively straightforward conflict between two 
groups, bereft of the chaos that distinguished rural 
conflicts, historians have consequently characterized 
the Greek civil war as a conflict between two political 
factions . This interpretation is misguided. ELAS 
activity in Athens in December 1944 was not part of a 
coordinated effort to gain control of the country. In 
fact, the majority of ELAS operations took place far 
from Athens in the provinces, where its armed bands 
worked towards suppressing communal conflicts, 
disarming villages and defeating rival groups. 
The nature of fighting in December 1944-January 
1945, the first phase of the Greek civil war, was born 
out of the conditions of collaboration and resistance to 
the occupation and bore little resemblance to the later 
years of the civil war. The Greek civil war only took on 
a perceivably political character in the second phase of 
the war, when after twenty-one months of ceasefrre, 
EAM/ELAS re-opened hostilities in September 1946 
when a plebiscite brought the King back into power. 
Three years later, EAM/ELAS was fmally suppressed, 
but in the interim the conflict had created a new wave 
cf refugees as 500,000 people were driven from their 
homes. The creation of even more refugees was a 
tragic, yet fitting complement to the original refugee 
crisis that helped to explain why Greece had 
disintegrated into civil war. 
In drawing a distinction between "immediate" and 
"real" causes, Thucydides understood that the reasons 
for wars were multidimensional. He recognized that a 
multiplicity of factors, occurring over the short-term 
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and long-term, were at play when communities entered 
a struggle. Thucydides' appreciation of complex 
causality helps the modern historian to identify the 
underlying reasons for the outbreak of Greek civil war. 
The occupation and the civil war were measures of the 
extent to which the settlement of the refugees after the 
Greco-Turkish War had fostered mutual ethnic and 
class animosity between refugees and native Greeks. 
These mutual hatreds manifested most strongly in the 
conflicts between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, the 
inability of the refugees to assimilate as a result of 
cultural differences, and the physical segregation of 
the refugees in the cities and villages, all of which 
strengthened the refugees' sense of a separate identity. 
Yet the marginalization of the refugees and their 
abandonment of traditional political patrons after 1930 
provoked a greater degree of splintering within 
communities. During the occupation, pre-war 
fragmentation produced a profusion of competing 
ethnic factions vying for local supremacy, even within 
minor villages. 
With the outbreak of war, the artificial physical 
boundaries that had been constructed before the war 
broke down, as Greeks, both refugee and native, were 
drawn by the tumultuous experiences of occupation 
into the vortex of collaboration and resistance. The 
occupation led to the reassertion of separate, 
conflicting identities on the part of both refugees and 
natives on the basis of ethnicity and class. These 
identities were more virulent in their character 
because divisions between groups were exploited by 
the policies of the Greek resistance groups and the 
occupiers. In each community the reaction to 
collaboration and resistance varied, but the basis for 
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finding identifiable patterns among groups in the 
midst of the chaos of war rests on an understanding of 
the pre-war divisions between refugees and native 
Greeks. It can be concluded then that the traditional 
Cold War vision of the Greek Civil War as a conflict of 
two political camps misreads the situation poorly. This 
paper reoriented the focus of traditional approach to 
the Greek Civil War by turning attention away from 
"Athens, London, and Washington" and towards 
"villages, valleys, [and] the provinces." Only with this 
perspective can historians construct a narrative of the 
war that fmally puts flight to the outdated Cold War 
interpretations. 
Michael O'Sullivan is a History major with a 
European emphasis and a member of Phi Alpha Theta. 
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